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Abstract
The objective of this article is twofold. First, it investigates mereology in medieval
Islamic theology, particularly the theologians’ claim that the whole is identical to its
parts and accordingly that at least some attributes common to the partsmust by exten-
sion be attributed of the whole. This claim was refuted by philosophers and, from the
eleventh century onwards, an increasing number of theologians. Second, it offers a new
interpretation of the standard theological proof from accidents for creation ex nihilo,
to which this problemwas central. A wide range of early, classical and later theological
and philosophical sources are consulted.
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This article investigates a previously unknowndebate onmereology,whichwas
played out between theologians and their adversaries and among theologians
starting from the second/eighth century.1 The debate turned on the theolog-
1 I amgrateful to the anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft, and to theHuman-
ities Research Fellowship programme at NewYork University Abu Dhabi for affordingme the
opportunity to complete this study. A note on convention: Arabic book titles are introduced
with an accompanying English translation only if they are of intrinsic interest to the discus-
sion. Most titles are not.
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ical view that the whole is identical to its parts and accordingly that at least
some attributes common to the parts are also attributes of the whole. Theolo-
gians of both the Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī schools defended this principle in the
course of arguing for the creation of theworld exnihilo through thewell-known
proof from accidents, in which it served as a direct route to the createdness of
the world starting from the createdness of its parts. This mereological line of
reasoning was refuted by their philosopher critics, most notably the eternalist
Avicenna (d. 428/1037), aswell as an increasing number of theologians from the
fifth/eleventh century onwards, including Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044),
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). By revealing
the crucial role that mereology played in the proof from accidents, our study
will offer a new account both of the proof itself and of its historical develop-
ment. Against the current view that the proof initially suffered from a serious
logical flaw, which was not rectified until the fifth/eleventh century, we shall
argue that this flaw in fact never existed.
1 The Proof from Accidents: Background
Introduced by the early Baṣran Muʿtazilī Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. 227/841)
and grounded in his atomist ontology, the proof from accidents (dalīl al-aʿrāḍ)
was the first fully-fledged proof for creation ex nihilo in kalām.2 But it was also
the most successful proof, as it is attested in a wide range of sources across the
full spectrum of theological schools in the classical period and continued to be
one of the most important and ubiquitous proofs for this doctrine in later the-
ology. In its earlier form, the proof consists of four theses, termed “contentions”
(daʿwā) by the Baṣran Muʿtazila and “principles” (aṣl) by Ashʿarīs:
1. The affirmation of accidents (ithbāt al-aʿrāḍ), which is to say that they
exist. Accidents are superadded objects (maʿnā) that inhere in atoms.
2. Accidents are originated (ḥudūth or ḥadath al-aʿrāḍ).
2 The proof is attributed to him, for instance, by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī fī abwāb
al-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl, 8. al-Makhlūq, ed. by Tawfīq al-Ṭawīl and Saʿīd Zāyid (Cairo: al-Dār al-
miṣriyya li-l-taʾlīf wa-l-tarjama, 1965), 286; Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī, Ziyādāt al-Sharḥ, ed. by
Muḥammad ʿA. AbūRīda (Cairo: al-Muʾassasa al-miṣriyya al-ʿāmma li-l-taʾlīf wa-l-tarjamawa-
l-ṭibāʿawa-l-nashr, 1969), 101; IbnMattawayh,al-Tadhkira fī aḥkāmal-jawāhirwa-l-aʿrāḍ, ed. by
Daniel Gimaret, 2 vols (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 2009), 1, 31; Mānkdīm,
Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa, ed. by ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān (Cairo: MaktabatWahba, 1965), 95; cf.
Josef van Ess, Theology and Society in the Second and Third Centuries of the Hijra, tr. by Gwen-
dolin Boldblum (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 3, 248–50.
mereology in kalām 7
Oriens 48 (2020) 5–39
3. Atoms (or bodies) cannot be devoid (yataʿarrā, yanfakku, yakhlū) of, and
hence cannot pre-exist, accidents.3
4. Because they do not pre-exist accidents, which are originated, atoms (or
bodies) too must be originated.
It follows that the world, being the combination of all atoms and accidents, is
created in time, out of nothing. Eachof these theses is supportedwith evidence,
and is susceptible to objections, orwhat theologians describe as “specious argu-
ments” (sg. shubha), which tend to be addressed thoroughly in longer texts,
and less so or not at all in shorter ones. It will be noted that the proof, as its
philosopher critics complained, lacks a familiar syllogistic structure. After all,
classical kalām did not have recourse to syllogistic logic, and it was only under
the influence of philosophical logic that later versions of the proof came to be
formulated as a syllogism:4
1. Bodies cannot be devoid of accidents.
2. Accidents are originated things.
3. Therefore, bodies cannot be devoid of originated things.
4. What cannot be devoid of originated things is itself originated.
5. Therefore, bodies are originated.
In what follows, however, we shall reference the classical, four-thesis formula-
tion. The structure of the proof has little bearing on the problem at hand.
In the present paper, we are solely concerned with how the fourth thesis is
defended. The thesis is inferred from the second and third theses thus: because
atoms do not pre-exist accidents, and because accidents are originated, atoms
too must be originated. Therefore, because it is the totality of all atoms and
accidents, the world came to be in time, ex nihilo. Qualifying the assertion that
‘atoms do not pre-exist accidents,’ classical-kalām sources explain that what an
atom does not pre-exist is only the very first accident that supervened thereon.
It is hence this initial accident, rather than subsequent accidents or the entirety
of accidents, that constitutes the evidence (dalīl) proper for the createdness of
atoms, even though this initial accident is individually unknowable to us, as we
know neither the ab initio locations of atoms nor the time of their coming to
be.5
3 In some sources, this appears as the second thesis.
4 AymanShihadeh, “TheArgument from Ignorance and ItsCritics inMedievalArabicThought,”
Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013): 171–220, at 173–5; Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, Ghurar al-
adilla, in Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa-l-naql, ed. by Muḥammad R. Sālim, 11 vols
(Riyadh: Jāmiʿat al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd al-islāmiyya, 1991), 9, 134; al-Ghazālī, al-
Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqāḍ, ed. by IbrāhīmA. Çubukçu andHüseyin Atay (Ankara: Nurmatbaasi, 1962),
26ff.; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl fī dirāyat al-uṣūl, ed. by Saʿīd ʿA. Fūda, 5 vols
(Beirut: Dār al-dhakhāʾir, 2015), 1, 223ff.
5 Anonymous 1, in Al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbādPromoter of RationalTheology:TwoMuʿtazilī kalāmTexts
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Although, at first glance, the fourth thesismay seem tohave been adequately
substantiated through the second and third, it is nonetheless susceptible to an
objection, indeed themost serious objection raised against the proof fromacci-
dents. As one source puts it, this is where the real battle begins, as it is the point
at which the doctrine of creation ex nihilo comes into direct conflict with eter-
nalist cosmologies.6 Various medieval philosophers, including Ibn Suwār (d.
after 407/1017), Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. before 560/1164–5) and Averroes
(d. 595/1198), objected that theologians cannot help themselves to the fourth
thesis so easily, because the second thesis states that each accident is origi-
nated, whereas the fourth thesis presupposes a further thesis—namely, that, as
well as each being originated, past accidents are also quantitatively finite. Thus
far, thequantitative finitudeof past accidents remainsunsubstantiated, leaving
the fourth thesis susceptible to the objection that the series of past originated
things is beginningless (ḥawādith lāawwala la-hā).7This I shall henceforth refer
to simply as the infinite regress thesis. If A1-An are all the accidents that super-
vened in succession on a given atom (A1 being the most recent) such that each
accident passed away as a new one came to be, and if each of these accidents
is originated, and if atoms cannot be devoid of accidents, then this atom can-
not pre-exist the very first accident that supervened thereon. Critics objected
that even if the first three theses of the proof are admitted, it will nonetheless
be conceivable that every accident that came to be in an atom was preceded
by another accident ad infinitum, A1-A∞, and accordingly that there was no ini-
tial accident An, whose host atom could not pre-exist. Atoms, on this scenario,
would be pre-eternal. Averroes famously deems this a fatal flaw in the proof,
andopines that itwas only addressedby “later” theologians, bywhomhemeans
from the Cairo Geniza, ed. by Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke (Leiden: Brill, 2017),
35–6 (the first of the two texts published in this book consists of fragments of an uniden-
tified fourth/tenth-century Bahshamī source; why the editors gloss over this fact and make
no attempt to justify the attribution to Ibn ʿAbbād is beyond me); Abū Rashīd, Ziyādāt, 236;
al-Malāḥimī, al-Fāʾiq fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. byWilferd Madelung andMartin McDermott (Tehran:
Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2007), 11; al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. by ʿAlī S. al-
Nashshār, Fayṣal B. ʿAwn and Suhayr M. Mukhtār. (Alexandria: Munshaʾat al-maʿārif, 1969),
221–2.
6 Al-Harrāsī, Uṣūl al-dīn, MS Cairo, Dār al-kutub al-miṣriyya, kalām 290, fol. 52a; also cited by
Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ, 1, 95.
7 For instance, Ibn Suwār, Maqāla fī anna dalīl Yaḥya al-Naḥwī ʿalā ḥadath al-ʿālam awlā bi-
l-qabūl min dalīl al-mutakallimīn aṣlan, in al-Aflāṭūniyya al-muḥdatha ʿinda l-ʿarab, ed. by
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Kuwait: Wikālat al-maṭbūʿāt, 1977), 243–7, at 244–5; Abū l-Barakāt
al-Baghdādī, al-Muʿtabar fī l-ḥikma, ed. by ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAlawī al-Ḥaḍramī et al., 3 vols (Hyder-
abad: Dāʾirat al-maʿārif al-ʿuthmāniyya, 1357AH), 3, 31–2; Averroes, al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-
adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla. ed. by Muḥammad ʿA. al-Jābirī (Beirut: Markaz dirāsāt al-waḥda al-
ʿarabiyya, 1998), 109–10.
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the Ashʿarī theologian al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), who supposedly supplemented
the proof with arguments for the impossibility of a beginningless series of acci-
dents.8
This account of the history of the proof fromaccidents has by and large been
accepted in recent scholarship.HerbertDavidson argues that earlier kalām the-
ologians failed to substantiate the fourth thesis and that the proof was “left at
that” until theMuʿtazilī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025) supplemented it with argu-
ments for the impossibility of a beginningless series of accidents.9 Following
Averroes, he identifies al-Juwaynī as a key figure who developed a new version
of the proof by substituting the fourth thesis of the older versionwith the thesis
that a beginningless series of originated things is impossible, and he remarks
that al-Juwaynī claims credit for this new version.10
In this article, however, we show that this standard account is off the mark.
Early theologians, indeed from as early as Abū l-Hudhayl himself, were in fact
confronted by the infinite regress problem and addressed it in defence of the
fourth thesis. The main argument they adduced in this defence was grounded
in what I shall term the mereological principle, which in its developed form
states that an attribute common to the parts is also an attribute of their total-
ity. A rudimentary version is attested in Abū l-Hudhayl, the more developed
version in numerous classical and later theological sources.
2 Mereology in the Proof from Accidents: I. Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf
Abū l-Hudhayl, to start with, was evidently aware of the challenge posed by
the infinite regress problem, which most likely arose in discussions he report-
edly hadwith eternalists (dahriyya). He acknowledged that this problemwould
vitiate proofs for both the creation of bodies ex nihilo and consequently the
existence of the Creator.11 His solution to the problem invoked the concepts
‘part’ (baʿḍ), ‘entirety’ ( jamīʿ) and ‘whole’ (kull), a theme to which he report-
8 Averroes, Kashf, 110.
9 Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation, and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 143–6 at 143.
Daniel Gimaret likewise contends that the fourth thesis was defended only through argu-
ments for the impossibility of a beginningless series of accidents (La doctrine d’al-Ashʿarī
[Paris: Cerf, 2007], 225–7). The present author also accepted Averroes’s account in a pre-
vious publication (“Existence of God,” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic
Theology, ed. by Tim Winter [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008], 197–217, at
205–6).
10 Davidson, Proofs, 146.
11 Al-Khayyāṭ, Kitāb al-Intiṣār, ed. by Albert N. Nader (Beirut: al-Maṭbaʿa al-kathūlīkiyya,
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edly gave much attention in discussions of creation ex nihilo.12 (Throughout
this paper, Arabic and English words denoting totalities in so far as they are
totalities are treated as synonyms, as their semantic nuances have no impact
on the ideas dealt with here.) There is ample evidence that he adduced an early
version of the mereological principle, which goes something like this: if multi-
ple things share the same attribute they will have a totality, and all that has a
totality must be quantitatively finite.
Abū l-Hudhayl, first of all, contends that originated things (muḥdathāt) have
“a whole and totality.”13 Accidents have a totality and make up a single whole,
whereas atoms make up a different whole.14 The same is true of accidents of
the same class; the totality of motion accidents, for instance, constitute a sin-
gle whole. We can infer from these examples that for a set of items to make
up a totality, they must all share the same attribute. Motions have a totality
on account of being motions, and so do atoms on account of being atoms. On
account of being originated all atoms and accidentsmake up a larger totality of
originated things. The arguments he adduced for this contention are reported
tersely and rather opaquely in the available sources. They include this reduc-
tio ad absurdum. Whenever parts aggregate, they constitute a whole, because
if an aggregation of parts were not a whole, a whole need not be aggregated of
parts, which is impossible.15 The argument presupposes the coextensiveness of
the definition of ‘whole’ as ‘the aggregation of parts.’16 The terse report does
1957), 18. Abū l-Hudhayl is reported to have debated the proof fromaccidentswith eternal-
ists (al-Murtaḍā, Amālī, ed. byMuḥammadA. Ibrāhīm, 2 vols [Cairo: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī,
1954], 1, 181).
12 The early Muʿtazilī al-Khayyāṭ (d. ca. 300/913) describes discussions “of what existed in
the past and will exist in the future, of the whole and the part, and of the finite and the
infinite” as “a major principle” in theology and a difficult topic which Abū l-Hudhayl dis-
cussed often (al-Khayyāṭ, Intiṣār, 18; 15; cf. al-Kaʿbī, Kitāb Maqālāt, ed. by Hüseyin Hansu,
Rājiḥ Kurdī and ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Kurdī [Istanbul: Kuramer, 2018], 163; al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt
al-islāmiyyīn, ed. by Helmut Ritter [Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1980], 1, 485; 163). This con-
nects mereology to questions of the temporal finitude of the world and the quantitative
finitude of things a part ante and a parte post. Abū l-Hudhayl’s priority was to prove
creation ex nihilo, but he was forced to concede that because originated things are quan-
titatively finite a parte ante, they must likewise be quantitatively finite a parte post. The
details are of little relevance here. See van Ess, Theology, 3, 276ff.
13 Al-Khayyāṭ, Intiṣār, 16; cf. 91.
14 Al-Khayyāṭ, Intiṣār, 20.
15 Al-Khayyāṭ, Intiṣār, 16–7.
16 On this criterion of definition, see Robert Brunschvig, “Ǧāmiʿ Māniʿ,” in Études d’ islamo-
logie, ed. by Abdel Magid Turki, 2 vols (Paris: Éditions Larose, 1976), 2: 355–7. Another
argument is that when I say, ‘no motions are rocks,’ I pass a judgement on the totality of
motions, not on individualmotions; therefore,motions have a totality (al-Khayyāṭ, Intiṣār,
20–1).
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not spell out how Abū l-Hudhayl justified this position. It is fairly easy to see
how the notion that an aggregation of parts may not constitute a whole could
be problematic, but it is less obvious how this view would entail that not all
wholes need be aggregated of parts.
Abū l-Hudhayl furthermore held that a totalitymust be quantitatively finite,
although the fragmentary statements attributed to him shed little light on how
he arrived at this view. All we can gather is that he appears convinced that a
wholemust have a limit (ghāya), or an end (nihāya).17 It is likely that he thought
that for something to be a totality it must encompass all its parts, and that for
something to encompass a set of items it must have boundaries beyond which
none of those items are present. It would follow that a totality must be quanti-
tatively finite.18
That Abū l-Hudhayl applied his early version of the mereological principle
to prove the creation of the world ex nihilo is evident.19 By virtue of sharing
the attribute of being originated, originated things—the past and present con-
stituents of the world—have a totality and are therefore quantitatively finite.
God by contrast has neither parts nor a totality, and is therefore not finite.With
this, the second, third and fourth theses of Abū l-Hudhayl’s four-stepproof from
accidents for creation ex nihilo fall into place. If, as per the second thesis, each
accident comes to be in time, then all accidents will share the quality of being
originated and thereby must have a totality and hence be quantitatively finite,
which is to say that they must thus have a beginning in time. And because
atoms cannot be devoid of accidents, they cannot pre-exist the totality of acci-
dents. The arguer can then deduce the fourth thesis, that if the totality of past
accidents have a beginning in time, and if atoms do not pre-exist the totality
of accidents, then atoms too must be originated, which is to say that all atoms
come to be in time. Therefore, the world is created ex nihilo.
3 Mereology in the Proof from Accidents: II. Classical Kalām
Abū l-Hudhayl’s primitive mereological argument, to my knowledge, is no-
where deployed in extant later sources; no subsequent theologian would argue
17 Al-Khayyāṭ, Intiṣār, 16–7.
18 As supplementary evidence, Abū l-Hudhayl further adduced Qurʾānic texts that refer to
“everything” (kull shayʾ), which he interpreted as indicating that things have a whole (li-
l-ashyāʾ kull), which is encompassed in God’s knowledge; and what is encompassed must
be finite (al-Khayyāṭ, Intiṣār, 17, citing Q. 2.29; 16.77; 41.54; 72.28). This is a grammatically
unjustifiable reading, as kull in these Qurʾānic citations has the sense of ‘each,’ not ‘all.’
19 Al-Khayyāṭ, Intiṣār, 16.
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simply from the homogeneity of multiple items to their quantitative finitude.
To the contrary, it is widely accepted that a totality may, in principle, com-
prise either a finite or an infinite quantity of items.20 In Baṣran Muʿtazilism
and classical Ashʿarism, we encounter a more developed appeal to mereology,
through which an attribute is extended from the parts to the whole. This prin-
ciple, henceforth termed themereological principle, goes as follows:
If multiple things share the same attribute x, they will have a totality, and
xwill itself be attributed of this totality.
This unqualified, universally applicable formulation of the principle is encoun-
tered in more concise instances of the proof from accidents typically found in
shorter theological works, and it is most likely the earliest, primitive formu-
lation of the principle. In longer, more detailed instances of the proof from
accidents, the principle is restricted to necessary attributes, to the exclusion
of possible attributes: only if x is a necessary attribute of each part will x be
attributed of their totality. We shall return to this qualification in Section 5.
When themereological principle is applied to accidentswith respect to their
shared attribute of ‘being originated’ (ḥādith), it gives us what, in the context
of the proof from accidents, I shall term simply themereological argument:
Because accidents share the attribute of being temporally initiated, they
have a totality, and their totality too is temporally initiated.
‘Temporally initiated’ here corresponds to the expression ‘having a beginning’
(lahu awwal), which is widely attested in the sources. In the case of the total-
ity of a series of accidents, ‘the beginning’ will refer to the initial accident
in the series. However, in the case of an individual accident, it will refer to
the temporal beginning of its existence, which is the moment of its coming-
to-be. The latter notion is often expressed more accurately as ‘the accident
having a beginning to its existence’ (li-wujūdihi awwal). For some sources,
however, awwal strictly speaking means ‘first thing,’ and is hence used lit-
erally in the former sense, and only figuratively (majāz) and to an extent
unsatisfactorily in the latter.21 Although both senses are said to reduce to the
20 For instance, Abū Rashīd, Ziyādāt, 239–40. Two later thinkers who denied that a totality
could be infinite are the sixth/twelfth-century colleagues Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī (Ḥudūth
al-ʿālam, ed. by Mahdi Mohaghegh [Tehran: Muʾassasa-i muṭālaʿāt-i islāmī, 1998], 26) and
Sharaf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī (Ayman Shihadeh, Doubts on Avicenna: A Study and Edition of
Sharaf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī’s Commentary on the Ishārāt [Leiden: Brill, 2016], 151 ff.).
21 Anonymous 1, 55–6.
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same concept of ‘the subject’s being temporally preceded by its non-existence’
(whether the subject is a thing or a totality), we shall later on see how this dual
sense was found problematic by many.
The earliest known occurrence of the developed version of the mereolog-
ical argument is attested in the beginning of a lost work titled al-Masāʾil al-
ʿaskariyyāt by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933), the eponymous founder of
the Bahshamī branch of Baṣran Muʿtazilism. He reportedly countered the infi-
nite regress thesis by arguing that if we postulate a beginningless series of past
originated things, those things will have a totality ( jumla), or a whole (kull).
And although this totality is infinite, it will nonetheless be a knowledge-object
for us, presumably because each of its parts is an actual or possible knowledge-
object for us;22 so because the totality is a knowledge-object, we are able to
determine properties thereof, specifically whether it could be, as postulated,
beginningless.23 Abū Hāshim argues that this postulate involves a contradic-
tion (tanāquḍ), because a totality cannot be temporally beginningless when
each of its parts (baʿḍ) has a temporal beginning. The postulate would be just
as contradictory as it would be to assert that a body is at once both moving
and immobile. Being impossible, such contradictions can only be committed
verbally, but never express a mentally conceivable state of affairs (yaqaʿu fī l-
ʿibārāt dūn al-iʿtiqādāt wa-l-madhāhib).24 In AbūHāshim’s version of themere-
ological argument, the principle that an attribute shared by the units must be
an attribute of their totality is strongly implied but not explicitly stated.
This line of reasoning was developed further by Abū Hāshim’s followers,
the Bahshamīs, most of whom considered it to be the main defence of the
fourth thesis of the proof from accidents, so much so that one source iden-
tifies the mereological principle as the only belief whose denial would hold
one up from inferring the fourth thesis from the preceding theses.25 The prin-
22 They are all actual knowledge-objects for God. However, the argument is obviously made
from our (human) perspective.
23 I render ʿilm, in the sense of a discrete item of knowledge (as opposed to a body of knowl-
edge), as ‘knowledge-item’, and maʿlūm as ‘knowledge-object’. Correspondingly, maqdūr
is rendered as ‘power-object’.
24 Anonymous 1, 51; Abū Rashīd, Ziyādāt, 239–40; Ibn Mattawayh, al-Majmūʿ fī l-Muḥīṭ bi-l-
taklīf, ed. by ʿUmar S. ʿAzmī (Cairo: al-Dār al-miṣriyya lil-taʾlīf wa-l-tarjama, 1965), 1, 67–8;
al-Jishumī, Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-masāʾil, MS Sanaa, al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, al-Maktaba al-gharbiyya,
foll. 178b–179a.
25 Ibn Mattawayh writes that a second misbelief that would have the same result is that
an atom may pre-exist accidents; however, this is already addressed in the third thesis
(Majmūʿ, 1, 66). An exception among Bahshamīs is Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Baṣrī (d. 369/980),
who relied on a different argument in support of the fourth thesis, thoughhe did not reject
the mereological argument (Majmūʿ, 1, 68–9).
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ciple is adduced, for instance, by a fourth/tenth-century Bahshamī, who argues
as follows:
If it is established that eachone [of a set of things] is originated, then their
entirety ( jamīʿ) too must be originated. It is impossible that they all be
originated, and yet have no beginning; for describing them as originated
excludes the view that they have no beginning.26
He adds that “it is impossible for an attribute to be affirmed for individual
things, but negated of their whole, as this would be a contradiction.”27 Like-
wise, the influential ʿAbd al-Jabbār defends the fourth thesis by saying that the
notion of a beginningless series of accidents involves a contradiction,
[…] because each one of them has a beginning. It is therefore impossible
for their entirety not to have a beginning, because originatedness is true
of them all. Therefore, because their whole must have a beginning, and
because a body cannot be devoid of their entirety, it must be originated,
just as it would be if it had not been devoid of a single originated thing.28
The same argument occurs in other fifth/eleventh-century Bahshamī sources,
including Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī (d. ?), Ibn Mattawayh (d. ?), Yaḥyā ibn al-
Ḥusayn al-Buṭḥānī (d. 424/1033) and al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101), as well
as in theologically Muʿtazilī Imāmī sources, such as al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044)
and al-Karājakī (d. 449/1057).29 The argument is also adduced by the non-
26 Anonymous 1, 56–7.
27 Anonymous 1, 57. Reading li-āḥād for li-ījād, and a-lā tarā anna-hu for illā matā inna-hu,
and fa-kawn for yakūna (which does not fit with ithbāt), and omitting the editors’ inter-
polations (yaṣiḥḥu, bi-an, qīla) (ll. 12–14).
28 Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn, in Rasāʾil al-ʿadl wa-l-tawḥīd, ed. by
Muḥammad ʿAmāra, 2 vols (Cairo: Dār al-shurūq, 1988), 1: 197–282, at 206 (reading ka-an
for kāna); cf. al-Buṭḥānī, Ziyādāt Sharḥ al-uṣūl, ed. by Camila Adang, Wilferd Madelung
and Sabine Schmidtke (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 45 (citing ʿAbd al-Jabbār); al-Murtaḍā, al-
Mulakhkhaṣ fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. by Muḥammad R. Qummī (Tehran: Markaz-i nashr-i dān-
ishgāhī, 2002), 55 (where the same equation is made between the body being devoid of
multiple originated things and it being devoid of a single originated thing).
29 Abū Rashīd, Ziyādāt, 239–43; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1, 67; al-Buṭḥānī, Ziyādāt, 45–6; al-
Jishumī, Sharḥ, foll. 178b–179a; Anonymous 2, Sharḥ Kitāb al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir
wa-l-aʿrāḍ, facsimile edition with introduction by Sabine Schmidtke (Tehran: Iranian
Institute of Philosophy, 2006), foll. 13a–b; al-Karājakī, Kanz al-fawāʾid, ed. by ʿAbdallāh
Niʿma, 2 vols (Beirut: Dār al-aḍwāʾ, 1985), 1, 40–1. For al-Murtaḍā, see the previous note
and p. 25 below.
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Bahshamī BaṣranMuʿtazilī Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in his earlier manual Ghurar
al-adilla, where he argues for the finitude of the series of past accidents as fol-
lows: “Because each originated item has a beginning, it is impossible for their
entirety ( jamīʿ) not to have a beginning, as [the whole] is nothing but its indi-
vidual units.”30 As we shall see, Abū l-Ḥusayn’s position on the mereological
principle shifts in a later work.
Classical Ashʿarīs too support the fourth thesis in the same way. Adducing
Abū Hāshim’s version of the argument in his commentary on Abū l-Ḥasan al-
Ashʿarī’s (d. 324/936) Lumaʿ, al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) remarks that this is the
clearest (aqrab) argument against the infinite regress of past originated things.
Originated things, he says, have a “whole and entirety,” and it would be contra-
dictory to assert that eachhas a beginning to its existencewhereas the totality is
beginningless.31 Al-Bāqillānī is also reported by al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī (d. 504/1110)
to have argued that an originated thing must, by definition, have a beginning
to its existence. So,
If all originated things are taken in combination (ḍummat) with each
other so that they are anaggregate ( jamʿ), their realitywill not change. Be-
cause anoriginated thinghas abeginning, so toomustmultiple originated
things have beginnings, as the reality does not changewith aggregation.32
In the fifth/eleventh and early sixth/twelfth century, the same line of reasoning
is attested in ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1038), al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058),
al-Juwaynī and Abū l-Qāsim al-Anṣārī (d. 512/1118), who writes: “A totality is an
aggregate of individuals; and if the reality of an individual originated thing is
that it has a beginning, then the reality of multiple originated things is that
they have a beginning.”33 The argument is also adduced by the (non-Ashʿarī)
theologian Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) in his own proof for creation ex nihilo.34
30 Abū l-Ḥusayn, Ghurar, in Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ, 9, 137; cf. 8, 18. I render ḥādith in this case as
‘originated item’ because Abū l-Ḥusayn denied that accidents were objects.
31 Al-Bāqillānī, Sharḥ al-Lumaʿ, in Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ, 8, 340–1.
32 Al-Harrāsī, Uṣūl, fol. 53b.
33 Al-Anṣārī, al-Ghunya fī l-kalām, ed. byMuṣṭafā Ḥ. ʿAbd al-Hādī, 2 vols (Cairo: Dār al-salām,
2010), 1, 317; cf. AbūManṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī,Uṣūl al-dīn (Istanbul: Madrasat al-
ilāhiyyāt bi-dār al-funūn al-turkiyya, 1928), 59–60; al-Māwardī, Aʿlām al-nubuwwa (Beirut:
Dār al-kutubal-ʿilmiyya, 1986), 10; al-Juwaynī, Lumaʿal-adilla fī qawāʿid ʿaqāʾidahlal-sunna
wa-l-jamāʿa, ed. by FawqiyyaḤ.Maḥmūd (Beirut: ʿĀlamal-kutub, 1987), 90 (occurring only
in the earlier version of the book, cited here); al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 216–7.
34 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Fiṣal fī l-milal wa-l-ahwāʾ wa-l-niḥal, ed. by Muḥammad I. Naṣr and ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān ʿUmayra, 5 vols (Beirut: Dār al-jīl, 1996), 1, 57–8.
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Theologians support the mereological principle in two ways.35 Some con-
sider it self-evident, and accordingly infer the fourth thesis immediately from
the second and third. This explains its absence in some of the more concise
iterations of the proof from accidents. Others hold that the principle must be
deduced through arguments. Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī appears to have taken the
former positionwith respect to his early version of the principle, as our sources
suggest that he did not feel the need either to defend or to refine it. In other
sources, the principle is supported, as is often the case in classical kalām, with
analogies, typically with identically-coloured bodies: if each crow is black, the
totality of crows will be black.36 Other examples are adduced. If each individ-
ual is existent, male or an unbeliever, then their totality will be, respectively,
existent, male or unbelieving.We shall further investigate theological defences
of the mereological principle in Section 5, our concern in the present section
being how it was formulated and applied.
It is abundantly evident, therefore, that the mereological argument was
widely adduced in support of the fourth thesis of the proof from accidents. It
was in fact considered the principal andmost direct route to securing this the-
sis, because it involved simply the affirmation of the attribute of the parts to
their whole, in contrast to arguments against the infinite regress thesis, which
typically postulated this thesis and reduced it to absurdity, thus proving cre-
ation ex nihilo indirectly. To the theologians themselves, themereological argu-
ment fulfilled its task satisfactorily, in as much as the principal objective of
kalāmwas to afford rational substantiation to a set of theological doctrines. At
the same time, however, they knew that the argument was sorely insufficient
for dialectical purposes, and that much more work was needed to refute the
infinite regress thesis, whichwas given impetus and thrust into themainstream
of kalāmby the vocal contrarian Ibn al-Rāwandī in hisKitābal-Tāj.37 The fourth
35 For instance, Abū Rashīd takes the former view (Ziyādāt, 231 ff.), whereas Ibn Mattawayh
takes the latter (Majmūʿ, 65–6).
36 Anonymous 1, 57; Abū l-Ḥusayn, Ghurar, in Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ, 9, 137; Abū Rashīd, Ziyā-
dāt, 242–3; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 59; al-Jishumī, Sharḥ, fol. 178b; al-Buṭḥānī, Ziyādāt,
46; Anonymous 2, Sharḥ al-Tadhkira, fol. 13a; Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī, Tamhīd al-uṣūl (Qum: al-
Markaz al-takhaṣṣuṣī li-ʿilm al-kalām al-islāmī, 2016), 64. The sources normally analogise
to people (zunj) rather than to crows.
37 The infinite regress thesis is frequently ascribed to Ibn al-Rāwandī in fourth/tenth- and
fifth/eleventh-century sources (al-Khayyāṭ, Intiṣār, 18; 19–20; 21; Anonymous 1, 51; Ibn
Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 1, 33; 42; Mānkdīm, Sharḥ, 113; al-Buṭḥānī, Ziyādāt, 9; al-Murtaḍā,
Mulakhkhaṣ, 56–7; Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī, Tamhīd, 63–4; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Uṣūl al-Dīn, MS
Beirut, American University of Beirut Library, 297:R27kA, fol. 22a). Ibn al-Rāwandī is also
the likeliest target of al-Kaʿbī’s response to unnamed “godless individuals” (mulḥidūn) in
the recently publishedMaqālāt, which was completed in 290/903 (577ff.; for titles of ded-
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thesis of the proof from accidents thus needed to be defendedwithmuchmore
than themereological argument. For this reason, the four-step proof from acci-
dents is normally appended with a dedicated discussion typically titled, “On
the impossibility of a beginningless series of originated things (ḥawādith lā
awwal la-hā),” or “That originated things have a beginning,” in which themere-
ological argument is set out alongside further, auxiliary arguments.
Averroes’s aforementioned account of the history of the proof from acci-
dents for creation ex nihilo, repeated in recent studies, is therefore incorrect.
The fourth thesis of the proof was not left undefended by Abū l-Hudhayl and
other early theologians, nor was it patched up only when later, fifth/eleventh-
century sources noticed the shortcoming and consequently secured this thesis
using arguments against infinite regress. Itwas in fact supportedwith themere-
ological argument from the start. Al-Juwaynī neither developed a substantially
new version of the proof from accidents, nor in fact did he claim to do so.38
Averroes’s view that al-Juwaynī was the first theologian to support the fourth
thesis stems from his limited access to pre-Juwaynian Ashʿarī summae and
his complete lack of access to Muʿtazilī texts.39 What al-Juwaynī introduced
to the proof from accidents was in fact only a comparatively minor structural
adjustment, to which the young Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī refers when he writes the
following on Ashʿarīs:
Our [earlier] school-members count the four principles as the affirmation
and originatedness of accidents, the impossibility that atoms be devoid of
accidents, and fourthly “that what cannot be devoid of originated things
must itself be originated.” They then respond to eternalists (azaliyya)
in a separate discussion. Later [school-members] count the discussion
against eternalists as one of the four principles, and say that it follows
from these principles that what cannot be devoid of originated things
must itself be originated.40
icated responses to Ibn al-Rāwandī by al-Kaʿbī, see Racha El Omari, The Theology of Abū
l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931) [Leiden: Brill, 2016], 18; 25).
38 Pace Davidson, who says that al-Juwaynī takes credit for developing a new version of the
proof (Proofs, 14). Al-Juwaynī refers, not to the four-thesis proof, but clearly to one of his
arguments against the infinite regress thesis (Shāmil, 218–19).
39 The latter point is admitted in Averroes, Kashf, 118.
40 Al-Rāzī, Uṣūl, foll. 22a–b. On this text, see Ayman Shihadeh, “Al-Rāzī’s Earliest Kalām
Work: Eastern Ashʿarism in the Twelfth Century,” in Philosophical Theology in Islam: Later
Ashʿarism East andWest, ed. by Ayman Shihadeh and Jan Thiele (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 36–
70. Al-Rāzī in this text follows al-Juwaynī’s arrangement.
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As noted, earlier kalām sources generally append the proof from accidents
with arguments that bolster its fourth thesis by refuting the eternalist infi-
nite regress thesis. The innovation introduced by al-Juwaynī (representing the
“later” Ashʿarīs mentioned in the passage just quoted) is to incorporate this
appendant discussion, which is to say the thesis that “originated things have
a beginning” (al-ḥawādith la-hā awwal), into the proof itself. This becomes
the fourth thesis of the proof, replacing the thesis, “Because they do not pre-
exist originated things, atoms must themselves be originated”. This last thesis
in turn is made the conclusion of the proof, which follows from (tarattaba ʿalā,
or kharaja min) its four theses.41 Al-Juwaynī’s improved formulation is born of
a desire to tighten up the proof: instead of starting by establishing the fourth
thesis and then eliminating the eternalist counter-thesis in a subsequent dis-
cussion, he does all this in one and the same discussion. That al-Juwaynī did
not consider this new formulation to be substantively different from the old
one is evident in the fact that the two occur, and are treated as identical, in the
earlier recension of his Lumaʿ.42
4 Philosophical Refutations of the Mereological Principle: Yaḥyā ibn
ʿAdī, Avicenna and Others
Before we turn our attention to theological defences and elaborations of the
mereological principle, it behoves us first to examine criticism it aroused
among Aristotelian philosophers. There are good historical and analytical rea-
sons for us to start with the criticism before the defence. As mentioned, the
principle was initially given a simple formulation and effectively treated as
having unqualified, universal applicability. It was subsequently defended and
developed within a dialectical milieu, in which theologians honed their argu-
ment for creation ex nihilo in response to refutations coming mainly from out-
side the theological tradition, particularly earlier on frometernalists (dahriyya)
and then from philosophers. These refutations raise questions that we our-
selves would ask of the principle, and are of the types that we shall consider
in the present section—after all, the philosophers to be discussed here refute
themereological principle only in its universal formulation, and do not engage
with theological qualifications and defences thereof.
41 Al-Juwaynī, Kitāb al-Irshād ilā qawāṭiʿ al-adilla fī uṣūl al-iʿtiqād, ed. by Muḥammad Mūsā
and ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1950) 17–18; 27; Shāmil, 166; 220.
42 Al-Juwaynī, Lumaʿ, 87–8; 90.
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With the waning of the earlier Dahrī current, and the ascendancy of Aris-
totelianism in the fourth/tenth century, the kalām proof from accidents came
under a second wave of attack, this time from the rival tradition of Aristotelian
philosophy. Short treatises devoted to refuting the proof were penned by the
Christian Aristotelians of Baghdad Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī (d. 363/974) and his student
Ibn Suwār, who adhered to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo but were nonethe-
less convinced that the proof was in several respects unsound. Without iden-
tifying Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī by name, Ibn Suwār responds to his contention
that the proof from accidents is the only proof for creation ex nihilo, stress-
ing that by refuting this proof he does not refute the doctrine for which it is
adduced.43 He promotes a proof put forth by John Philoponus as a superior
alternative. Representing the eternalist strand of Arabic Aristotelianism, Avi-
cenna defends the pre-eternity of the world by mounting a further challenge
to proofs for creation ex nihilo and against pre-eternalism, including the proof
from accidents. Some of these Aristotelian refutations, especially Ibn ʿAdī’s and
Avicenna’s, had a significant impact on subsequent theological versions of the
proof from accidents.
The most potent criticisms levelled against the proof from accidents by
these two philosophers are those that target its fourth thesis, including refuta-
tions of themereological argument.TheḤanbalī theologian IbnTaymiyya,who
was keenly interested in the history of the debate, classifies these refutations
alongside objections put forth by some theologians into a fourfold taxonomy,
in which he draws on Aristotelian logic and the tradition of juristic dialectic
( jadal):44
1. Begging the question. It is objected that the argument begs the question,
because it is premised on a mere assertion (muṣādara) of its conclu-
sion. Some totalities are such that an attribute common to the parts is
extended to the totality—let us call those type-A totalities. Type-B total-
ities are such that the attribute common to the parts is not extended to
their totality.What themereological argument lacks, according to its crit-
ics, is evidence that the totality of objects sharing the attribute of being
originated is a type-A totality.
Ibn Taymiyya then turns to the argument from analogy adduced in support
of the mereological principle. In classical kalām, as in jurisprudence, analogy
(qiyās) involves arguing from one particular case, called the primary case (aṣl),
(say, the totality of black crows) to another particular case, called the secondary
43 Ibn Suwār, Maqāla, 243; 245–6. On Abū Hāshim’s position, see, for instance, Ibn Matt-
awayh, Majmūʿ, 38; 71.
44 Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ, 9, 138–9.
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case ( farʿ), (the totality of originated things) without the need to establish a
universal statement. In Aristotelian logic, this form of argument, termed qiyās
al-tamthīl, is described as an argument from particular examples (the total-
ity of black crows) to a universal statement (the mereological principle). Ibn
Taymiyya points out that critics countered the analogies adduced by exponents
of themereological argument by pursuing three lines of refutation. As they are
taught in the tradition of juristic dialectic ( jadal), these types of refutation are
standard objections (iʿtirāḍ) deployable against arguments from analogy:45
2. Denial (manʿ). An analogy starts from a claim identifying the determi-
nant (ʿilla) on account of which a judgement (ḥukm) applies to a primary
case, where the determinant is a specific description (waṣf ) of that case.
The totality of crows (a primary case) is black (the judgement) because
individual crows share the attribute of being black (the determinant). An
objectormaydeny the claim in severalways—for instance, bydenying the
purported determinant of the judgement, or that the primary and sec-
ondary cases share the same description—leaving the burden of proof
on the arguer. In effect, this objection to the analogy at hand reduces
to the previous objection. It is not attested in any of sources considered
here.
3. Counter-evidence (muʿāraḍa). In the second of these analogy-busting
procedures, the objector presents counter-examples of cases that match
the description of the primary case of an analogy, but clearly do not share
its judgement, thereby illustrating the falsity of the universal assertion
that the judgement holds for all cases bearing that description.
4. Invalidating difference ( farq). An objector may invalidate an analogy by
pointing out a crucial difference between the primary and secondary
cases, specifically one or more aspects of the determinant of the judge-
ment that applies to the primary case, which is absent in the description
of the secondary case. The judgement consequently does not transfer to
the secondary case.
This helpful taxonomy of refutations to the mereological argument will be
adopted in our own investigation of the debate.
The third refutation is represented by one of the most widely attested,
and probably one of the earliest, objections.46 Its source is anonymous, but is
unlikely to be a philosopher. Al-Juwaynī attributes it to a “stupid person,” con-
45 On these dialectical procedures, see Walter E. Young, The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Dis-
putation and the Evolution of Islamic Law (Cham: Springer, 2017), 152–4; 176–82.
46 Anonymous 1, 57–9; Abū Rashīd, Ziyādāt, 240–2; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1, 67; Anony-
mous 2, Sharḥ al-Tadhkira, foll. 13a–b; al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 216–17.
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ceivably a reference to Ibn al-Rāwandī. It invokes thedoctrine of the infallibility
of theMuslim community in cases of consensus (ijmāʿ): even though each indi-
vidual believer is fallible, the totality of believers are infallible. Alternatively, it
sometimes starts from the notion that widely-transmitted reports (mutawātir)
are indubitably authentic, even though individual reports are of limited relia-
bility.
The first and third refutations are typified in a short epistle against the kalām
proof from accidents, titled Maqāla fī l-radd ʿalā man qāla bi-anna l-ajsām
muḥdatha (Treatise in Dialectical Refutation of Those Who Say that Bodies are
Originated), in which Ibn ʿAdī attacks the mereological argument as a sophism
(mughālaṭa).47 This epistle, as we shall see, had direct impact on theologians.
Ibn ʿAdī charges that themereological principle cannot be granted, as its expo-
nents fail to support it with a demonstration. He then counters that there are
countless cases in which a property (ḥukm) shared by the parts in fact does not
extend to their whole, and he gives counter-examples.48 If we were to divide
up ten thousand pounds of lead into one-pound portions, it would be possi-
ble for each portion to be lifted by one person, but this would not be possible
for the totality. Likewise, when a scribe copies a book, it is possible for him to
miss out any part of the book, but impossible for him to miss out the entire
book. Because Ibn ʿAdī’s text is explicitly dialectical in its approach, he deems
it sufficient to illustrate the falsity of the theologians’ mereological argument
without needing to tender his own account of which properties do extend from
the parts to the whole and under what conditions. He does this in an unrelated
text titled Maqāla fī l-kull wa-l-ajzāʾ (Treatise on theWhole and the Parts).49
Avicenna’s engagement with the mereological principle is more complex.
In one work, he expresses disdain for the proof from accidents remarking that
its form is unsound and its premises false.50 One reason for this stance comes
to the fore in his responses to arguments against the infinite regress thesis—
argumentswhichwere transmitted in earlier philosophical literature, butmore
pressinglywere being deployedby contemporary theologians in defence of cre-
ation ex nihilo. Avicenna’s responses occur in discussions on pre-eternity in his
general philosophical treatises, most importantly in the Physics of the Shifāʾ
47 Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī, Maqāla fī l-radd ʿalā man qāla bi-anna l-ajsām muḥdatha, ed. and trans.
by Peter Adamson and RobertWisnovsky in id., “Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī on a Kalām Argument for
Creation,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 5 (2017): 213–39, at 234.
48 Ibn ʿAdī, Maqāla fī l-radd, 236.
49 Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī, Maqāla fī l-kull wa-l-ajzāʾ, ed. by Saḥbān Khulayfāt in id., Maqālāt Yaḥyā
ibn ʿAdī al-falsafiyya (Amman: University of Jordan, 1988), 212–19.
50 Avicenna, al-Taʿlīqāt, ed. by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-miṣriyya al-ʿāmma
li-l-kitāb, 1973), 37.
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and the shorter al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād, and they are set out more extensively
in a short work titled al-Ḥukūma fī ḥujaj al-muthbitīn li-l-māḍī mabdaʾ zamānī
(The Appraisal of the Arguments of Those Who Affirm a Temporal Beginning
to the Past), his dedicated response to a lost work in which John Philoponus
offered arguments against the pre-eternity of the world.51 Avicenna contends
that all these arguments are premised on the notion that past successive occur-
rences constitute a totality ( jumla), and that they attempt to demonstrate in
various ways how it is impossible that this totality be quantitatively infinite.
For instance, the well-known correspondence argument states that the series
of past successive motions cannot be infinite, because if it is assumed to be
infinite, the totality of motions up to the Flood would be smaller than their
totality up to our present time; however, an infinite quantity cannot be smaller
or greater than another infinite quantity.52 Avicenna complains that such argu-
ments treat past occurrences as constituting an existing, realised quantity
(kamm ḥāṣil), when in fact such a quantity cannot have an extra-mental real-
ity, as most things that came to be in the past no longer exist.53 A real totality,
as opposed to one depicted in the mind, requires the aggregation (ijtimāʿ) of
coevally existing things.54 This position stems from a position of mathemati-
cal realism, according to which quantities have a mind-independent reality as
accidents of material substances.55
Another argument confuted in the Shifāʾ is the classical-kalāmmereological
argument: “Because every motion is originated, the whole (kull) and totality
( jumla) of motions is originated.”56 In response, Avicenna says that arguers
51 On which, see Shlomo Pines, Studies in Arabic Versions of Greek Texts and in Medieval Sci-
ence (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1986), 321–6.
52 Avicenna, al-Shifāʾ, al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt, al-Samāʿ al-ṭabīʿī, tr. by Jon McGinnis, 2 vols (Provo:
Brigham Young University Press, 2009), I.III.11, 365. The correspondence (taṭbīq) argu-
ment was introduced by John Philoponus and reproduced in kalām (Davidson, Proofs,
88–9; 120–1).
53 Avicenna, al-Ḥukūma fī ḥujaj al-muthbitīn li-l-māḍī mabdaʾ zamānī, ed. by Mahdi
Mohaghegh (Tehran: Muʾassasa-i muṭālaʿāt-i islāmī, 1998), 142–4. A similar complaint
seems to have been made by al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) in a lost work titled al-Mawjūdāt
al-mutaghayyira (Maimonides, Dalālat al-ḥāʾirīn, ed. by Hüseyin Atay [Cairo: Maktabat
al-thaqāfa al-dīniyya, n.d.], 220–1).
54 Avicenna, Ṭabīʿiyyāt, I.III.11, 366–7; cf. Ḥukūma, 144–6; 148–9; al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād, ed.
by ʿAbdallāh Nūrānī (Tehran: Muʾassasa-i muṭālaʿāt-i islāmī, Dānishgāh-i Tihrān, 1984),
47.
55 Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt, III.5, 119 ff.; V.2, 212 (“a whole inasmuch as it is a whole exists in
things”); Mohammad S. Zarepour, “Avicenna on theNature of Mathematical Objects,”Dia-
logue 55 (2016): 511–36.
56 Avicenna, Ṭabīʿiyyāt, I.III.11, 365.
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show their ignorance of the difference between each one and the whole,
for when each thing is characterised by a certain attribute thewhole need
not be characterised by the same attribute, nor indeed must it have a
realised whole. Were that the case, the whole would be a part, since each
one is a part. Do they not57 see that each future thing is possible of exis-
tence, whereas their whole is not possible of existence! So it is not true
what they said—namely, thatwhen eachonepasses into actual existence,
thus becoming realised, the whole does so as well and is therefore not
infinite. The truth of the matter is as we stated—namely, that if ten finite
things come into existence in succession, each after the passing away of
another, thenundoubtedly eachoneof these tenwill actually have existed
at somemoment, whereas thewholewill never have existed as something
actual, for a whole such as this has, as a whole, no existence at all.58
Avicenna thus raises two objections to themereological argument, both stated
in theopening sentence.The first is the sameas Ibn ʿAdī’s objection to themere-
ological principle—thatwhenmultiple individual items share a given attribute
(ṣifa), their totality need not have the same attribute. He gives two pieces of
counter-evidence (the third type of objection): each item is said to be a “part”
( juzʾ), whereas the whole is not; and even though future occurrences are each
individually possible of existence, their totality is not possible of existence. For
Avicenna’s adversaries, the latter outcome follows from the notion that future
occurrences are alternative possibilities, each of whichmay ormay not exist: it
is possible that the weather here be either clear or rainy at midday tomorrow,
but it is impossible that it beboth.What ismore, theologianshold that although
there is an infinite number of things possible of existence at each moment—
for example, an infinite number of atoms—it is not possible that an infinite
number of things exist at any moment.59
In his second objection, Avicenna differentiates between cases in which
items add up to a totality and cases in which they do not (the invalidating-
difference objection). He references his general criticism of arguments against
the pre-eternity of the world, which is that a series of things that come to be
and pass away in succession does not have a real totality. Because the series of
past successivemotions does not have a totality in the first place, it cannot have
57 Reading a-lā yarawna for wa-lā yarawna, as in the published editions.
58 Avicenna, Ṭabīʿiyyāt, I.III.11, 368–9 (based on McGinnis’s excellent translation, with ad-
justments); cf. Mabdaʾ, 47.
59 For Avicenna himself, future occurrences do not constitute a totality primarily because
they will exist, not coevally, but in succession (taʿāqub) (Mabdaʾ, 47).
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an attribute in the way an individual object does. So even though each motion
is originated, motions do not have a totality to which this same attribute can
be extended.
In the sixth/twelfth century, Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī launches a further
attack on the proof from accidents, particularly on themereological argument.
His refutation is that the claim, ‘because each motion is originated the totality
of motions must be temporally initiated,’ is merely an assertion (muṣādara)
of the conclusion of the proof.60 Even if each motion is originated, motion
per se (muṭlaq) need not be originated. So no contradiction is committed in
asserting that the parts are originated while the totality is pre-eternal.61 Abū
l-Barakāt thus echoes earlier philosophical criticisms of the proof from acci-
dents, here presented as a syllogism, by complaining that its middle term is
equivocal: in the minor premise, ‘cannot be devoid of what is originated (al-
muḥdath)’ means ‘cannot be devoid of originated things per se,’ whereas in the
major premise it means ‘cannot be devoid of a particular originated thing.’62
These criticisms are echoed in later philosophical literature, which need not
be surveyed here. Both of Avicenna’s objections are deployed. They are repro-
ducedby Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), and it is partly, if notmainly,
through his works and commentaries thereon that these objections appear to
be transmitted to later philosophical sources.63
Of the objections advanced by philosophers and presumably by earlier eter-
nalists the most problematic in classical kalām was the objection through
counter-evidence, of which we may identify two types. Some attributes only
hold for totalities but never for parts, or vice versa (e.g. ‘set,’ ‘ten’ and ‘part’);
other attributes may in principle hold for either parts or totalities, but often
hold for the parts but not for their totality, or vice versa (as with the fore-
going example of the possibility of future occurrences). Avicenna’s objection
from the non-coevality of the parts of a temporally-ordered series comes to the
attention of theologians from around the turn of the sixth/twelfth century.
60 Abū l-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, 3, 31.
61 Abū l-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, 3, 45–6.
62 Abū l-Barakāt, Muʿtabar, 3, 31–2.
63 Al-Suhrawardī,Hịkmatal-ishrāq, ed. and trans. by JohnWalbridge andHosseinZiai (Provo,
UT: Brigham Young University Press, 1999), 120–1; Ibn Kammūna, Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt al-
lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿarshiyya, ed. by Najafqulī Ḥabībī, 3 vols (Tehran: Mīrāth-i maktūb, 2009), 3,
275–6; Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, ed. by ʿAbdallāh Nūrānī andMahdī
Muḥaqqiq (Tehran: Anjuman-i āthār u mafākhir-i farhangī, 2000), 393–4.
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5 Theological Defences and Refutations of the Mereological
Principle
As already mentioned, Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī appears to have considered his
early application of the mereological principle self-evident. Subsequent the-
ologians had to develop and defend it under the sustained criticism that cre-
ation ex nihilo and the mereological argument continued to receive. Ibn al-
Rāwandī, as noted, was often invoked as the principal advocate of the infinite
regress thesis, but the criticisms advanced by Aristotelian philosophers were
getting much attention already in the classical period. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī,
who was closely connected to Baghdad Aristotelianism, was aware of the pre-
viously discussed epistle in which Ibn ʿAdī objected to the mereological argu-
ment, as in Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla he quotes, and responds to, another passage from
this work.64 A response to Ibn ʿAdī’s epistle, titled Fī l-radd ʿalā Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī fī
iʿtirāḍihi dalīl al-muwaḥḥidīn fī ḥadath al-ʿālam (A Response to Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī
Concerning His Objections to the Theists’ Proof for the Creation of the World),
was also reportedly penned by al-Murtaḍā, an Imāmī whose core theological
views were Bahshamī.65 Al-Murtaḍā wrote a further relevant response to Ibn
ʿAdī titled al-Kalām fī-mā yatanāhā wa-lā yatanāhā (On the Finite and the Infi-
nite).66 Neither text is known to be extant. Abū l-Ḥusayn furthermore reports
that he deployed themereological principle in a debate he hadwith an uniden-
tified adversary, most likely an Aristotelian, who failed to offer a satisfactory
response.67 His contemporary IbnMattawayh ascribes the denial of themereo-
logical principle to “some philosophers,” most probably a reference to Baghdad
Aristotelians.68We therefore have ample evidence of a debate around the turn
of the fifth/eleventh century betweenBaghdadAristotelians andMuʿtazilīs sur-
rounding the kalām proof from accidents, and the mereological argument in
particular.
It will be recalled that the argument cited in support of the mereolog-
ical argument is an analogy, and that the most serious objection that this
64 Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla, in al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn fī l-radd
ʿalā l-falāsifa, ed. byHassanAnsari andWilferdMadelung (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Phi-
losophy, 2008), 32 (reading yalzamuhu for yulzimuhu, l. 6); cf. Ibn ʿAdī, Maqāla fī l-radd,
230.
65 Al-Najāshī, Rijāl al-Najāshī, ed. by Mūsā al-Zanjānī (Qum: Muʾassasat al-nashr al-islāmī,
1418AH), 270; al-Iṣfahānī, Riyāḍ al-ʿulamāʾ wa-ḥiyāḍ al-fuḍalāʾ, ed. by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī, 6
vols (Qum: Maktabat al-Khayyām, 1981), 4, 36.
66 Al-Murtaḍā, Mulakhkhaṣ, 62; al-Iṣfahānī, Riyāḍ, 4, 36.
67 Abū l-Ḥusayn, Taṣaffuḥ, in al-Malāḥimī, al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. by Wilferd
Madelung (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2007), 138.
68 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 66.
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analogy faced in classical kalām was the argument from counter-evidence.
Theologians responded by developing the mereological principle from its all-
encompassing, universal formulation to a qualified formulation applicable to
a much narrower scope of attributes.
The principle is qualified in accordance with classical-kalām theories of
attributes. At the most basic level, it operates only in the domain of the reali-
ties (ḥaqāʾiq) of objects,69 as opposed to the linguistic and conceptual domains,
which is to say that it applies only to real attributes (ṣifa thābita) of objects.70
“Realities,” al-Juwaynī writes, “do not differ in states of separation or com-
bination” (al-ḥaqāʾiq lā takhtalifu bi-l-infirād wa-l-ijtimāʿ).71 Muʿtazilī sources
are more specific still, restricting its applicability to necessary attributes (ṣifa
wājiba) of existent objects, to the exclusion of possible attributes, which an
object may or may not have on account of certain causes extraneous to itself.
Althoughdifferent schools of thought advocate different accounts of how these
necessary attributes are realised, which we shall not go into here, the bottom
line for our present purposes is broadly the same—namely, that a necessary
attribute is one that an existent object cannot conceivably lack, be it an essen-
tial or non-essential attribute. Expressions that describe objects or states of
affairs but do not meet this criterion fall outside the scope of the mereologi-
cal principle.
Now,weknow that, in classical-kalām atomism,monads—that is, atoms and
accidents—are attribute-bearing objects. But what of totalities? What is the
ontological status of a totality, and to what extent do expressions that describe
totalities refer to real attributes thereof? These questions are answered directly
by al-Malāḥimī at the start of his defence of creation ex nihilo against Avicenna
in Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn. Theologians and philosophers, he observes, mean
different things when they speak of “the existence of the world.”72 For philoso-
phers, the combination of two things may produce a third, composite thing,
which will exist neither as the mere “sum (majmūʿ) of the parts, nor as each
one (kull wāḥid) of them.”73 A human, a building, a bed and theworld thus exist
each as a thing in its own right over and above its parts, just as oxymel has a real-
ity of its own and exists over and above the sugar and vinegar of whosemixture
it is produced. This notion is, of course, grounded in Peripatetic hylomorphism,
according to which the form of the composite is one and unified and not the
69 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 216–7.
70 We are obviously concerned here only with the attributes of objects other than God.
71 Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 217; see also the quote from al-Bāqillānī, p. 15 above.
72 Al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfa, 15.
73 Al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfa, 16–7.
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mere sum of the forms of its parts—a notion given expression already in Aris-
totle’s Metaphysics Z.17. In kalām, however, only the monadic parts exist—the
atoms and the accidents—and only they are possessed of real attributes. Their
combination will yield a body or bodies with a specific structure, for which an
expression is conventionally assigned, but will not produce a thing that exists
over and above its parts, or that itself bears any attributes. The existence of the
totality is reducible to the existence of its parts, and its attributes are accord-
ingly reducible to those of its parts.74 Oxymel is not a thing in its own right, but
consists of a mixture of discrete parts of sugar and parts of vinegar.75 Theolo-
gians therefore infer the origination of the world immediately once they have
proved the origination of its parts, because to them the world is nothing but
the sum of its parts.
Based on the qualification that descriptive expressions whose referents are
not real but merely conceptual fall outside the scope of the mereological prin-
ciple, exponents of the principle were readily able to identify one category of
expressions as having no bearing thereon. Some expressions are nouns that
specifically denote totalities (ism jumla), and hence do not refer to attributes
of individual parts.76 These include such expressions as ‘ten,’ ‘man,’ which is
a name for the totality of parts that make up the human body,77 ‘finite’ and
‘infinite.’78 As just explained, these are designations conventionally assigned
74 Bahshamīs make an exception for animate attributes such as life and knowledge, which
they hold to be reified attributes (sg. ḥāl) that are caused by monadic accidents but
nonetheless qualify the entire living body, in contrast to attributes that are not exclusive to
living bodies, which only qualify an accident’s atomist substrate (RichardM. Frank, Beings
and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Muʿtazila in the Classical
Period [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978], 39ff.; Ayman Shihadeh, “Classi-
cal Ashʿarī Anthropology: Body, Life and Spirit,” The Muslim World 102 (2012): 433–77, at
449–58, where the Ashʿarī refutation of this view is also discussed). Animate attributes,
however, do not engender a unifying essence for the composite body. The Bahshamī the-
ory of reified attributes is opposed by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and al-Malāḥimī. The latter
only remarks that the totality may have an effect (taʾthīr) that its parts lack when sepa-
rate, although this must not be taken to imply that it has a reality distinct from its parts. (I
translate ḥāl as ‘reified attribute’ to convey the meaning of the term, which is completely
lost with the literal ‘state’.)
75 In turn, both sugar and vinegar, of course, are no more than combinations of atoms and
accidents (colour, taste, smell, etc.), and are not substances in their own right.
76 These are not always collective nouns (ism jamʿ), which are nouns that denote groups of
individuals, such as qawm and jamāʿa.
77 On classical-kalām conceptions of the human as a totality, see Shihadeh, “Classical Ashʿarī
Anthropology,” 437ff.
78 Abū Rashīd, Ziyādāt, 243; cf. Anonymous 1, 55–6; al-Jishumī, Sharḥ, foll. 258a–b; al-Malā-
ḥimī, Tuḥfa, 20. Strictly speaking, ‘finite’ (mutanāhī) means ‘has a final part’ (lahu nihāya/
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(mawḍūʿ) to a totality, not as a unified attribute-bearing substance—al-Malā-
ḥimī remarks that “ten, qua ten, does not bear a real attribute (ṣifa thābita)”79—
but only inasmuch as the totality consists of specific monads arranged in a
specific structure, which we are able to identify conceptually and linguisti-
cally as a particular type of totality. The structure is normally construed spa-
tially as the shape of a body or bodies, but can presumably be temporal, as
some expressions denote a sequence of temporally-ordered occurrences—for
instance, ‘prayer,’ which is defined as the totality ( jumla) of specific acts, ‘week’
and ‘farming.’ Either way, structure does not confer a reality on its parts, which
they would otherwise lack.80 We commit no contradiction, therefore, when
we speak of a totality as being infinite while denying that each of its parts is
infinite. We can assume that by the same token designations that strictly sig-
nify parts inasmuch as they are parts cannot signify wholes. This qualification
rebuts Avicenna’s complaint that the expression ‘part’ applies to each part, but
not to the whole.
In the same broad vein, al-Juwaynī addresses the oft-discussed counter-
example of consensus (ijmāʿ) orwidely transmitted reports (tawātur), inwhich
the reliability or veracity of the totality differs from that of individuals.81
Because the knowledge or belief that occurs in the listener after receiving a
report has no correspondence to the reality of the (oral or written) report or
the reporter, its reliability is not a real attribute either of the report or the
reporter to which the mereological principle could apply. It is rather a func-
tion of God’s will. The association of the two occurrences is grounded entirely
in God’s maintenance of familiar courses of events (ʿāda). Ordinarily, he does
not create indubitable knowledge in listeners when they receive a report trans-
mitted by a single transmitter, but he does create it when they receive a widely
transmitted report. He can choose to break the familiar course of events by
doing the reverse.
ākhir), and hence can only be said of a set or the parts of a divisible thing (cf. p. 12 above on
awwal). To say that God is infinite (lā nihāya lahu) is a figure of speech, as strictly speaking
it means that He does not have a final part, which presupposes that He has parts.
79 Al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfa, 20.
80 The ontological sense of the expression ḥaqīqa referred to here should not be confused
with its sense when it is contrasted to ‘figure of speech’ (majāz). The latter is the sense
intended when theologians, for instance, discuss ḥaqīqat al-insān. They refer to the defi-
nition of the expression ‘human,’ not to some intrinsic reality of the human as an object.
81 See pp. 20–1 above. Al-Juwaynī, Shāmil, 216–7. Reading bi-ḥaqīqa rājiʿa for bi-ḥaqīqatihi
rājiʿ (217, l. 5; MS Istanbul, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, fol. 49b, reads bi-ḥaqīqa rājiʿ). The text from
wa-idhā sabaqa … bi-munqaḍin in the edition (ll. 7–13) was a marginal note, as the MS
copyist indicates, but was incorrectly incorporated by the editors into the main text.
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Addressing the same counter-example, Bahshamī Muʿtazilīs appeal to their
qualification that the mereological principle applies only to necessary attri-
butes to the exclusion of possible attributes. They argue that it does not operate
when either of two types of possibility ( jawāz) identified by Abū Hāshim al-
Jubbāʾī is involved.82 The first is objective possibility, which lies in the power
(qudra) of an agent to produce a thing. An infinite number of atoms are thus
presently possible of existence inasmuch as they are power-objects (sg. maq-
dūr) for God, and a limited range of objects are presently possible of existence
asmypower-objects. However, the totality of either of these sets of possibilities
is presently impossible of existence. This is partly because they are alternative,
and hence mutually exclusive, possibilities: although moving and not moving
my right arm are each presently power-objects of mine, it is presently impos-
sible for me both to move and not to move my right arm at the same time.
Moreover, because God’s power-objects are infinite, only a finite quantity can
be actualised at any givenmoment. The second type of possibility is epistemic,
or subjective possibility, which arises fromdoubt (shakk). AbūRashīd gives two
examples: for all I know, I deem it possible that each of the inhabitants of my
city had lentil soup yesterday, or has forgotten that today is Tuesday, but I do
not infer that it is possible that absolutely all inhabitants of the city had lentil
soup yesterday, or do not know what day it is today.83 Another, curious exam-
ple given in one source is that while we accept the possibility that each human
may die at any given moment, we deem it impossible for their entirety to die
at the same moment.84 In the same vein, the judgement that each individual
is fallible expresses subjective possibility: because, for all we know, each indi-
vidual may hold an erroneous view on a given question, we cannot be certain
that Zayd will take the correct view if presented with the question. We cannot
infer that the totality of the Muslim community will accordingly be suscepti-
ble to error. Therefore, it is not contradictory to accept the fallibility of individ-
82 Anonymous 1, 57; Abū Rashīd, Ziyādāt, 241. On this distinction as it is made by al-Juwaynī,
evidently under Muʿtazilī influence, see Shihadeh, “Argument from Ignorance,” 195–8.
83 Abū Rashīd, Ziyādāt, 241. The text mentions a food called muṣabbara, which I have not
been able to identify. Lentil soup is a fairly safe substitute.
84 Anonymous 1, 57. This example is treated as an instance of epistemic possibility because it
is grounded in our ignorance of a living human’s time of death, and indeed it works only if
it is treated as such. But the example can also be analysed as a case of objective possibility,
because death, theologians believe, is caused by God’s power, and it is within His power
to cause the death of any human at any moment. A Muʿtazilī would presumably concede
that it is not impossible for God to cause all living humans to die simultaneously, and that
He will actually do so on the Day of Judgment.
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ual believers while upholding the infallibility of the Muslim community on
the basis of scriptural evidence, in the way that, according to our sources, it
would be contradictory to assert the actual theological misbelief of individual
non-believers while denying the theological misbelief of their entire commu-
nity.
This Bahshamī qualification is criticised by their fellowBaṣranMuʿtazilī Abū
l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla, the extensive but unfinished summa in
which he evaluates his predecessors’ arguments. He argues against the distinc-
tion that theymake between real attributes and possibilities.85 Possibility in an
existing thing, he says, is a real and necessary attribute thereof (al-jawāz huwa
al-ṣifa al-thābita, and jawāz dhālika wājib). Fallibility, the possibility of error
( jawāz al-khaṭaʾ), is a real attribute of each individual, and as such ought to be
an attribute of their totality. The same is somehow true of God’s power-objects.
But exactly what Abū l-Ḥusayn meant by affirming the reality of possibility is
a question that goes beyond the purview of the present article and cannot be
answered in our current state of knowledge of his theory of attributes, which
was significantly different from the Bahshamī theory. At any rate, Abū l-Ḥusayn
goes on to proffer his own solution to the puzzle concerning consensus, arguing
that it is a false counter-example, because consensus on a given view occurs,
not when individuals are susceptible to error, before they affirm or deny the
view, but only when they have all actually affirmed it. It thus accords with the
mereological principle, because each believer holds the correct view, and so
obviously does the community of believers. This raises the separate question
of how individuals can become collectively infallible despite being individu-
ally fallible. Abū l-Ḥusayn reasons that the properties (ḥukm) of an individual
may depend on whether it exists in isolation or in association (iqtirān) with
other individuals. When believers arrive at a view collectively, they do not
err, presumably because God safeguards them from collective error. Likewise,
taken on its own each power-object is possible of existence, but collectively
the totality of the infinite number of God’s power-objects is impossible of exis-
tence.
This attempt to salvage the mereological argument may appear to resonate
with our foregoing observation that Abū l-Ḥusayn adduces it in his earlierman-
ual Ghurar al-adilla. By the time he penned the Taṣaffuḥ, however, he had con-
cluded that the mereological argument is unsound, for he goes on to say:
85 Abū l-Ḥusayn, Taṣaffuḥ, in al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtamad, 138 (reading infirādihi, at l. 13); Tuḥfa,
21–2.
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I used this argument, which was adduced by our school-masters, in a
discussion with one of our adversaries, who failed to respond to it with
anything [worthy of mention]. However, it later became clear to me that
it did not entail [its conclusion].86
The adversary, as noted, is most likely an Aristotelian. The objection by which
Abū l-Ḥusayn himself accounts for his abandonment of themereological argu-
ment is a further instance of the invalidating difference objection, as it points
out a difference that invalidates the analogywith identically coloured bodies.87
The statement, ‘all crows are black,’ in fact reduces to the statement, ‘each crow
is black,’ as there is no blackness of which the totality is possessed over and
above that of individual crows, for the totality is nothing more than the sum
of its parts. In contrast, the statement, ‘the series of past motions is tempo-
rally initiated (lahu awwal),’ does not reduce to the statement, ‘each motion
is temporally initiated,’ because the property predicated of individual motions
in the latter statement is being originated (ḥādith), which is to say that each
motion becomes existent after it was non-existent, whereas the property pred-
icated of the series of motions in the former statement is being initiated in an
individual motion which no further motions pre-existed.88 There is, therefore,
no correspondence between the two cases in the analogy. Along similar lines,
Abū l-Ḥusayn takes issue with Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī’s argument that to state
that the series of past originated things is beginningless would be a contradic-
tion.89
Abū l-Ḥusayn, tomy knowledge, is the first theologian in the classical period
to reject the mereological principle. His objection is transmitted by his fol-
lower al-Malāḥimī in the Muʿtamad, where the mereological argument is duly
not endorsed but attributed to the Bahshamīs. In his later work, the Fāʾiq, al-
Malāḥimī completely omits it.90 But by the time he writes his refutation of
philosophy, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn, al-Malāḥimī has reverted to his master’s
earlier position, offering a passionate defence of the mereological argument,
which becomes his principal argument for the fourth thesis of the proof from
accidents.
86 Abū l-Ḥusayn, Taṣaffuḥ, in al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtamad, 138.
87 Abū l-Ḥusayn, Taṣaffuḥ, in al-Malāḥimī,Muʿtamad, 138–9 (the point is clear, despite what
appears to be a textual corruption on p. 138, ll. 20–1, specifically at nafy al-sawād ʿan).
88 Cf. al-Malāḥimī,Tuḥfa, 20–1, where the argument is reportedwithout attribution. Reading
lā bi-kawn for bi-kawn on p. 20, l. 24, and taʿtadda for taʿnada on p. 21, l. 3.
89 Abū l-Ḥusayn, Taṣaffuḥ, in al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtamad, 85.
90 Al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtamad, 138; Fāʾiq, 14–5.
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As for Avicenna’s criticism of the mereological argument from the non-
coevality of accidents, the first theologian to refer to it is al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111),
whoappears to recognise its potency, andpossibly accepts it.91He thusdoesnot
adduce the argument to substantiate the fourth thesis of the proof from acci-
dents in his theological manual, the Iqtiṣād.92 The first rebuttal of Avicenna’s
objection seems to come from al-Ghazālī’s follower Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī (d.
ca. 590/1194), who wrote a response to Avicenna’s aforementioned Ḥukūma,
titledḤudūthal-ʿālam. He counters the objection by arguing that numbers, and
therefore totalities, are purely conceptual (iʿtibārī): what exists extra-mentally
are numerable individual objects,whereas numbers exist only in themind.This
is evidenced by the observation that we judge a totality to be, at once, one
(an army) and multiple (soldiers); and because oneness and multiplicity are
mutually exclusive, they cannot both exist in the same object, and therefore
exist only in the mind. It follows that totalities can be coeval or non-coeval,
for either way they are conceptual.93 Ibn Ghaylān subsequently asserts the
classical-kalām mereological principle: unless a property is specific (khāṣṣ) to
individuals or totalities, it will transfer from the parts to their totality, be they,
of course, coeval or non-coeval.94
Around the turn of the seventh/thirteenth century, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī
offers further criticism of the mereological argument in some works, includ-
ing the earlier Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl and the later al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya. Like his older
contemporary Ibn Ghaylān, al-Rāzī identifies Avicenna’s objection from non-
coevality as his principal objection to the mereological argument, and he
rejects it as baseless.95 The general statement, ‘the totality of originated things
91 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, ed. by Maurice Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique,
1927), 33. He deploys Avicenna’s criticism against the latter’s appeal to mereology in his
proof from possibility for the existence of God, although al-Ghazālī seems tomisinterpret
that part of the proof effectively as an application of the kalām mereological principle,
which it is not (Tahāfut, 138–42). Al-Malāḥimī does the same (Tuḥfa, 42–3).
92 Al-Ghazālī, Iqtiṣād, 31–4; cf. al-Risāla al-qudsiyya, ed. by Abdel Latif Tibawi, in “Al-Gha-
zālī’s Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalem,” Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965): 65–122, at 81.
93 Ibn Ghaylān, Ḥudūth, 25–6.
94 Ibn Ghaylān, Ḥudūth, 36. He mentions the proof from accidents, including the mereolog-
ical argument, but considers it ineffectual against the philosophers’ eternalism and hence
does not take it forward (Ḥudūth, 15–6; Ayman Shihadeh, “A Post-Ghazālian Critic of Avi-
cenna: Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī on the Materia Medica of the Canon of Medicine,” Journal of
Islamic Studies 24 (2013): 135–74, at 143–4).
95 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya min al-ʿilm al-ilāhī, ed. by Aḥmad Ḥ. al-Saqqā, 8
parts in 5 vols (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabī, 1987), 4, 253–4; 262–3. Al-Rāzī was aware of
Avicenna’sḤukūma, as he read IbnGhaylān’sḤudūth al-ʿālam and appears to havewritten
a response to the latter (Shihadeh, “Post-Ghazālian Critic,” 146).
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existed,’ holds true whether those things existed simultaneously (bi-ṣifat al-
ijtimāʿ) or separately and successively (bi-ṣifat al-iftirāq wa-l-taʿāqub). If I say
that I met all the town’s inhabitants, you may legitimately ask whether I met
them all at once or individually. Avicenna, according to al-Rāzī, fails to justify
his restricted definition of ‘totality.’
Al-Rāzī, nonetheless, rejects the standard kalām argument by analogy with
the case of identically coloured bodies as flawed on two counts.96 The first (an
objection from counter-evidence) is that such analogies go no further than to
illustrate that at least some wholes bear the same attributes as their parts, and
thus fall short of establishing the universal applicability of the mereological
principle to all cases, for which further proof is needed.97 He cites counter-
evidence showing that wholes in fact need not bear the same attributes as their
parts, including some drawn from earlier sources. For instance, if something
is said to be a ‘part’ it is not said to be a ‘whole,’ the community is infallible
although individuals are fallible, and it is possible for each location-accident
(sg. kawn) not to exist in a given body but impossible for all location-accidents
to be absent therefrom.98 Al-Rāzī does not address BaṣranMuʿtazilī rebuttals to
such counter-evidence.The secondobjection (an invalidating difference objec-
tion) is that there is a key difference between the two cases of the analogy
adduced. However, the difference he identifies is epistemic: while it is imme-
diately evident (ḍarūrī) that the totality of black crows must be black, it is not
equally evident that the totality of temporally initiated things must itself be
temporally initiated. This indicates that the two cases are not equivalent, or at
least that further work is needed to establish their equivalence.
Yet despite his opposition to the classical-kalāmmereological argument, al-
Rāzī proposed a new argument inspired by Avicenna’s account of quiddity
(māhiyya), which was treated in many later sources as a reformulation of the
mereological argument. He counters the infinite regress thesis by arguing that
the quiddity of motion cannot be pre-eternal, as follows:
The reality andquiddity of motions is transition fromone state to another.
So motion is preceded by the state away from which the transition
occurred. Therefore, the reality of motion entails precededness (mas-
96 Al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 1, 343–4; Maṭālib, 4, 277–8; al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya, ed. by Zayn al-
ʿĀbidīn al-Mūsawī et al., 2 vols (Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-maʿārif al-ʿuthmāniyya, 1343AH), 1,
666; 668–9 (the first objection only).
97 This tallies with al-Rāzī’s assessment that arguing from analogy is inadequate for the pur-
poses of theology and philosophy (Nihāya, 1, 133–6).
98 Location-accidents are accidents that determine the location of an atom.
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būqiyya) by another. However, the reality of pre-eternity (azaliyya) does
not entail precededness by another. Therefore, it is impossible formotion
and pre-eternity to coincide.99
Al-Rāzī considers the conceptionof precededness by aprior state to be entailed
by the quiddity of motion as a constitutive thereof, and hence to hold for
motion per se and not merely for individual motions.100 And because the quid-
dity of motion is realised extramentally through its concrete instantiations,
precededness must hold for their entirety, which is to say that they must be
preceded by non-motion and consequently that it is impossible for motions to
regress infinitely a parte ante. The upshot is that this argument converges with
the classical-kalāmmereological argument by effectively extending a property
of the individuals to their totality. The later debate that surrounded this contro-
versial argument goes beyond our present purposes.101 Suffice it to point out,
however, that al-Rāzī’s new argument is just as susceptible as the traditional
mereological argument to the objection that while conceptions constitutive of
a quiddity hold necessarily for particular instantiations thereof, they do not
hold necessarily for the totality of instantiations.
Themereological argument continued to be debated up to the early-modern
period. The classical-kalām argument and variants of al-Rāzī’s argument are
adduced inmany later theological sources and confuted in others and in philo-
sophical sources. Of particular interest is Ibn Taymiyya, who takes al-Rāzī’s
criticism of the mereological argument to heart and develops it further in his
attack on refutations of infinite regress, through which he counters the kalām
notion that God had been an inactive agent for an eternity until he created the
99 Fakhr al-Dīn Al-Rāzī, al-Masāʾil al-khamsūn fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. by Aḥmad Ḥ. al-Saqqā
(Beirut: Dār al-jīl, 1990), 19; cf. Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾakhkhirīn min
al-ḥukamāʾ wa-l-mutakallimīn, ed. by Hüseyin Atay (Cairo: Maktabat dār al-turāth, 1991),
286; Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. by Aḥmad Ḥ. al-Saqqā, 2 vols (Cairo: Maktabat
al-kulliyyāt al-azhariyya, 1986), 1, 32–3; Maʿālim uṣūl al-dīn, ed. by Ṭāha ʿA. Saʿd (Cairo:
Maktabat al-kulliyyāt al-azhariyya, n.d.), 35.
100 Al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 293; 297–8.
101 Representative exponents: al-Ījī, al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-kutub, n.d.),
246; al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, ed. by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿUmayra, 5 vols (Beirut: ʿĀlam
al-kutub, 1998), 3, 109–13. Representative opponents: al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-
dīn, ed. byNizārḤammādī (Cairo: Dār al-aṣāla, 2020), 45–6; Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī,Talkhīṣ al-
Muḥaṣṣal (Beirut: Dār al-aḍwāʾ, 1985), 198; al-Kātibī,Ḥikmat al-ʿayn, ed. by Ṣāliḥ A. al-Turkī
(n.p., 2002), 52 (reading lā yunāfī for yunāfī, l. 19); al-Dawānī, Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-ʿAḍudiyya
(Cairo:Maktabat al-shurūq al-dawliyya, 2002), 49; Gelenbevi,Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥal-ʿAqāʾid
al-ʿAḍudiyya (Istanbul: Maṭbaʿat al-Ḥājj al-Muḥrim Afandī al-Būsnawī, 1303AH), 84–6.
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world.102 At any rate, although it continues to be adduced and contested, the
mereological argument somewhat diminished in significance with the devel-
opment of further proofs for creation ex nihilo and against the infinite regress
thesis.
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